First Composite Radio Company Fleet Marine Force Pacific |
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1st Composite Radio Company History (Page 2)
In March, 1964, the unit, then known as 1st
Radio Company, participated in a joint amphibious exercise with the Formosan (Taiwan) Army, known
as Operation Backpack.
The spring of 1964 saw a new, substantially larger Marine
communications detachment introduced into the northern provinces of South
Vietnam. Unlike its predecessors at Pleiku and Phu Bai, this unit was composed
exclusively of Marines and included an infantry element for security purposes.
Designated the Signal Engineering Survey Unit, the radio detachment consisted of
three officers and 27 enlisted men drawn from the 1st Radio Company, FMFPac, and
from Headquarters Marine Corps. This clement, commanded by Captain Alfred M.
Gray, Jr. arrived at Da Nang on 20 May along with a 76-man infantry detachment
from Company G, 2d Battalion, 3d Marines. The infantry element, reinforced with
an 81mm mortar section (two mortars), was commanded by First Lieutenant Raymond
J. Otiowski. Captain Gray assumed overall command of the composite force which
was designated Marine Detachment, Advisory Team One. Capt
Gray would later become the 29th Commandant
of the Marine Corps.
As mentioned earlier, the unit was re-designated as 1st
Radio Battalion in July, 1964 and 1st
Composite Radio Company, as we knew it, was no more.
(Back)
Footnote: From Robert Destatte CWO=3 3rdRRU
U.S. Army |
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One day in late
September, the Commander of the 3rd RRU, LTC Cochran, summoned Nelson and me to his office. He told us that Sub-Unit One was about to begin its third or fourth (I don't recall which) rotation of personnel at Pleiku. He explained that the NSA had complained that the previous rotations had not produced enough intercepts to justify the cost for maintaining the unit, and that NSA had decided to withdraw the USMC intercept mission if the next rotation failed to increase production significantly. LTC Cochran further explained that he had discussed the issue with the relevant USMC commander(s) and they had agreed that the short TDY tour at Pleiku had not allowed the USMC technicians adequate time to become familiar with their assigned targets and to develop the operational experience needed to become fully productive. Based on that analysis, LTC Cochran and the USMC commander(s) decided that the 3rd RRU would deploy two experienced intercept technicians to the USMC rotation that began in October. Nelson and I each had operational experience before deploying to Vietnam, and each of us had about 16 months of experience against Vietnamese targets. LTC Cochran charged Nelson and me to assist the USMC technicians identify their assigned targets and acquaint them with the known characteristics and idiosyncrasies of individual target transmitters and operators. I recall that Captain Fennel (spelling) maintained a graph on a wall in the operations area that charted the volume of production, beginning in January 1962. My memory is that the line on that graph took a nearly 90 degree curve upward shortly after the October rotation began operations. It pleased Nelson and me to believe we contributed in some small way to your success by helping you become familiar with your targets at the outset of your rotation. You and your colleagues demonstrated that the faith your commanders and LTC Cochran placed in you was fully justified. I know that LTC Cochran was pleased with the results your rotation produced, and he told Nelson and me that the NSA was happy. I believe Captain Fennel and MSG Sepulveda (spelling) were equally happy with your performance. I was just a young E-5 at the time, but from my vantage point it was clear that you and your colleagues saved the USMC SIGINT effort in Vietnam. So, I repeat, you are too modest! You and your fellow Marines performed much better than you might have realized at the time. |
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